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Price discrimination and price sensitivity in the
car market




The model in Verboven (2002) is extended to include non-zero price
elasticities and behavior in the fuel market is modelled explicitly. With
the use of simulations it is shown, that this makes quite a dierence and,
therefore, might lead to bias in parameter estimates
1 Introduction
This paper integrates two approaches of modelling the purchase of a
durable. The rst approach has been used to model the purchase of a
specic durable; the automobile. It assumes, that consumers have dierent
tastes for quality. Quality can be one dimensional (Bresnahan, 1987), which
means that a certain composite of product characteristics is used to indi-
cate quality. Alternatively, quality can be multi-dimensional (Berry, 1994;
Berry et.al. 1995; Feenstra et.al. 1995). A consumer with a certain taste for
quality chooses the car, which best matches his preferences given the price
of the car. On the supply side producers maximize prots by setting prices.
The variable costs of the car, i.e. the cost of driving one kilometer, is part
of the taste for quality. People with a tendency to drive more kilometers
are said to have a strong taste for the component of quality indicating fuel
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1cars. In the Netherlands sales tax on diesel cars is considerably higher than
sales tax on gasoline cars. There is a lump-sum tax dierence of 1868 euros
compared to an average price dierence of 2395 euros, but this still leaves
a sizeable price dierence of 517 euros. Verboven (2002) nds a similar
dierence in price, but there are no noteworthy lump-sum tax dierences.
A follow-up to this paper will investigate whether markups on diesel cars
exceed the markups on gasoline cars in the Dutch market. Therefore I will
at times point out the peculiarities of the Dutch car market.
In the presence of non-zero price elasticities of demand for kilometers,
the behavior of fuel producers can also be modelled. If prices had no eect
on demand, the optimal strategy for producers is to set prices as high as
possible, which is not realistic and will always be rejected by the data. In
this paper I will just show how fuel producer behavior could be modelled.
I will start by giving an outline of the game-theoretical framework un-
derlying the model in Section 2, then the model will be discussed in detail
in Section 3. With the aid of simulation I will show the possible eect of
this extended model in Section 4. Finally, a conclusion is given in Section
5.
2 Outline of the model
In this section an outline of the model of the automobile market is given.
In the next section it will be discussed in detail. An automobile is charac-
terized by its model (indexed by j) and its engine (indexed by k). There
are 3 groups of actors; consumers, producers of cars and producers of fuel
(i.e. diesel and gasoline).
It is assumed that consumers have already decided, which model they
want to purchase. Now, they have to choose between a diesel engine and a
gasoline engine. For each model car manufacturers usually oer a version
with a gasoline engine and a version with a diesel engine. Moreover, the
technical performances of these cars do not dier much. The points on
3which they do dier, which is basically cost, are easily measurable. So,
it is assumed that consumers are able to separate the choice of engine.
Consumers maximize utility, which has three arguments; the amount of
income spent on goods other than cars, mean intrinsic utility of owning
model (j;k) and the amount consumers drive (mileage). Consumers know
that the cost of driving a diesel car are lower than the cost of driving a
gasoline car, but the xed cost of a diesel car exceed the xed cost of a
gasoline car. Therefore, only consumers who are planning to drive more
than a certain amount of kilometers per year will choose a diesel car (see
Section 3.1).
Assume that for every car model, there is one producer. Since consumers
have already decided which model to choose, producers act as a monopolist.
They set the dierence in price between the car equipped with a diesel
engine and the one equipped with a gasoline engine, such that their prot
is maximized. Producers are aware that people who have a high mileage
are willing to pay more for a diesel, regardless of the actual (marginal) cost
dierences. This allows for (third degree) price discrimination. (see Section
3.2).
It is assumed, that all fuel is supplied by one producer, who can act
as a monopolist.1 Prot is maximized by setting the price of diesel and
gasoline. (see Section 3.4).
Endogenous variables are: choices made by individual consumers (rep-
resented by market share of gasoline cars: the number of gasoline cars of
model j sold divided by the number of cars of model j sold), price dierence
between diesel cars and gasoline cars, the price of diesel and the price of
gasoline. It is assumed that all endogenous variables are set simultaneously,
which leads to a one-shot pure Nash equilibrium (cf. Section 3.3).
1In the Netherlands a cartel might be active in this particular market. This has still not
been properly investigated by the Dutch Competition Authority.
43 The model
3.1 The demand for mileage
Consider the following indirect utility function (see Appendix A for the
derivation):
ujk = y   p






where j denotes the car model, k = G;D engine type, gasoline or diesel,
ujk utility derived from owning and using car model (j;k), y is income,
 an annualization coecient (see Appendix B), p
jk price of car (j;k),
including sales tax, jk lump sum tax on car (j;k), ajk mean intrinsic
utility of consuming (j;k),  a price sensitivity parameter and jk fuel
cost of driving one kilometer or equivalent measure.
jk is the marginal cost of driving. It is the product of the eciency of
a car (in liters/km, denoted by wjk) and the price per liter of fuel (denoted
by rk(1 + tk), where rk is price minus taxes and tk an ad valorem tax.)
Consumer heterogeneity is introduced through the 
j
0-constant, which
at jk = 0 can be interpreted as the amount of kilometers owner of model
j would drive in that particular point. Let 
j
0 2 j. It is assumed, that
there exists a function F;j : j ! [0;1] and F;j is non-decreasing and
dierentiable. F;j is the c.d.f. of 
j
0. Denote the p.d.f. by f;j. The F-
function describes the continuum of consumers on .









k denotes the amount owner of car (j;k) drives given jk. The price


















Assume that  2 [0;1=jk). The higher the variable cost (jk) of car (j;k),
the more sensitive the consumer is to small price changes. Since jD < jG,




G, a rise in the variable cost of gasoline cars
would have a larger relative eect, but not necessarily a larger absolute
eect.
There exists a unique 
j
0, denoted as 
j
, such that ujD = ujG. Straight-








where xj = xjD   xjG for a variable xj. Equation (4) is an extension of
Verboven (2002, eq.2) If  ! 0, then the denominator converges to j,
as can be veried using the rule of L'H^ opital.
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Note, that sGjj +sDjj=1, where sDjj is the market share of diesel cars. In-
terestingly, if  ! 0, then (5) can be transformed into a linear relationship
by multiplying both sides by j (cf. Verboven, 2002, eq. 7).
Let observed mileage demand be denoted by j. If  ! 0, then j = 
j
0.














At j = 
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D and the distribution of mileage demand
is not continuous in this particular point.
3.2 The price of cars
Every rm produces one model, j, and equips this model with either a
gasoline engine or a diesel engine. By setting dierent prices the rm can
in
uence sGjj and maximize its prots, which are given by:
(pjG   cjG)sGjj + (pjD   cjD)(1   sGjj); (7)
6A Derivation of the indirect utility func-
tion
Consumers receive extra utility when they drive more. This can be incor-
porated in two equivalent ways: assume a demand function for mileage
and derive (indirect) utility from the demand function or assume a utility
function dependent on the amount of kilometers consumed and then derive
the demand function and the indirect utility.
A.1 Starting point: a utility function
Let (j;k) be given, then the utility of the consumer depends on the ex-
penditure on other goods (z) as a function of 
j
k and the utility received
from consuming 
j
k. If y = y  p
jk  jk, then z = y  jk
j
k. The utility




k), where f > 0, f0 > 0 and f00 < 0.
Utility is given by:
 ujk(
j
k) = y   jk
j
k + ajk + f(
j
k): (34)









=  jk + f0(
j
k) = 0 =) f0(
j
k) = jk: (35)
From (35) follows the demand function of 
j
k. Substituting the demand
function in (34) gives the indirect utility.
A.2 Starting point: a demand function
Suppose the demand function of 
j








0 and  are parameters. Note that if the variable cost are zero, the
consumer will drive 
j
0 kilometers. So, 
j
0 is the maximum amount of 
j
k
the consumer will `purchase'. Substituting (36) in (34) gives the indirect
utility, but only if the function f is chosen in such a way that the demand




























































































k) < 0. Substitute (36) and (40) in (34) to
obtain the indirect utility function given in (1).
I would like to end by making some remarks about the function f:











This implies, that 8 2 [0;
j




0e] f0() < 0 Since
f0(
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B Derivation of the annualization coe-
cient
One of the rst papers using this concept is Hausman (1979). Instead of
referring to this paper I would rather give the derivation, basically because
Hausman (1979) does not.
20eciency. It should, however, be part of the price of owning and driving a
car.
An example of such an approach is Verboven (2002), a study much in
the vein of Berry (1994) and Berry et.al. (1995). It focuses on the choice
of engine in an automobile. The main factor determining this choice is the
amount of kilometers a person drives. If a person drives a lot the high price
of purchasing a diesel car is oset by its lower cost of driving one kilometer.
Instead of assuming that people who intensively use a car have strong taste
for the fuel eciency component of quality, the choice of engine can depend
on evaluation of the cost structure dierence.
Unfortunately in Verboven (2002), the amount of kilometers demanded
is xed (but varies over persons) or, put dierently, the (short term) price
elasticity of the demand for kilometers is equal to zero. Most empirical
studies have found small but signicant price elasticities. These estimates
are usually between 0 and  0:5. See Goodwin (1992) for a review.
The second approach are studies, like Hausman (1979) and Dubin et.al.
(1984), which provide a useful alternative for examining the purchase and
use of a durable. Although both articles are about electric appliances, the
basic structure of the problem is the same and in most respects quite
similar to Verboven (2002). The dierence is that Hausman (1979) and
Dubin et.al. (1984) use a utility function, in which extra utility is derived
from the usage of the durable. It is acknowledged that the decision to
buy a certain brand of durable depends on the cost of use and since these
cost may vary over brands, the intensity of use may dier over brands
and this leads to non-zero price-elasticities. Verboven (2002) argues that
these elasticities are so small that their eect is negligible. It is investigated
whether this is the case.
Verboven (2002) showed that for the Belgian, French and Italian car
market, observed price dierences between cars with diesel engines and
cars with gasoline engines are mainly due to a higher mark-up on diesel
2where pjk is the price of car model (j;k) before taxes and cjk the constant
marginal cost of this model. Let p
jk = pjk(1 + b) + k, where b denotes
value added taxes on car (j;k) and k a lump sum tax or subsidy.
It is clear from (4), that consumers care only about the dierence in
sales prices. Since there is a linear relationship between p
j (sales price)
and pj (sales price minus tax), this implies that instead of setting pD and
pG, producers can set pj. This follows also from the non-existence of an
outside opportunity (i.e. not purchasing a car, but an alternative mode of
transport). There is no need to model an outside opportunity, because we
are only interested in the dierence in price.































in (8) yields (cf. Verboven, 2002, eq.8):











The dierence in price can be split in two parts; dierence in marginal
cost and dierence in mark-up. It is widely believed, that diesel cars are
more costly to produce. However, Verboven (2002) shows that for the Bel-
gian, French and Italian market just 16% of price dierences can be ex-
plained from cost dierences.
While the model does not exclude that cj < 0, markups are positive
by construction. This follows from the observed fact, that jG > jD. If
consumers discount future cash 
ows heavily, then  is small and, therefore,
markups are high. This is because consumers are less sensitive to price
changes. If the value added tax (b) increases, then markups decrease. This
can be seen as a typical trait of a monopolistic market, where the burden of
additional taxes are worn by both consumers and producers. The roles of
7the p.d.f. and c.d.f of  are less clear. For instance, if the value of F is close
to one, then the value of f will be close to zero. The ratio of (1   F)=f
can be anything. If  has an exponential distribution, then the ratio is
equal to one. It is also hard to pinpoint the economic interpretation of
(1   F)=f. A possible explanation is that it represent how sensitive to car
price dierences consumers are given the market share.
There are two obvious extensions:competition between models and de-
termination of car model characteristics.
A car producer may acknowledge the fact that by setting his prices,
he may lose or win customers to other models. Then one must drop the
assumption, that model choice is given. This implies that consumer prefer-
ences must be modelled more explicitly. In this paper we have been able to
mostly avoid the problem of measuring consumer preferences, because the
source of heterogeneity in this paper are not preferences but the demand
for mileage. See Bresnahan (1987) and Berry (1994) for examples of these
extensions.
Dierences in technological performance are captured by the aj-
variable. It is assumed, that this is a constant, but you could let producers
increase or decrease the dierence in performance to maximize prot. It is
reasonable that aj is constant in the short run, because most manufac-
tures leave a model unchanged for two to four years.
3.3 Solution


















0 is uniformly distributed on the interval [0;j
m] then the following


























Note that since 1
[e jG   e jD] is negative by assumption, one of
the conditions for 
j
 is in the interior of [0;j
m] is that aj  (1+b)pj  
 j < 0 (cf. 4). If 
j
 can be any point in the interior of [0;j
m], then
sGjj 2 (0;1). From (11) it follows, that pj > cj. Therefore aj  (1+
b)cj   j can have any sign. If it is positive, then sGjj < 1=2 and
else it is larger than 1=2.
The second part of (13) is a dierent way to express the markup, which
is positive, because 1
[e jG  e jD] is negative. Since there are no prior
assumptions on cj, theoretically the sign of pj is undetermined. How-
ever, we know from practice, that pj  0. Therefore, it is believed that
either cj and the mark-up have the same positive sign or, cj < 0 and
the absolute value of the marginal cost dierence is much smaller than the
positive mark-up.
3.4 Endogenizing fuel prices
This is a simplied example of how fuel prices could be endogenized. It
is simplied not because the algebra is that dicult, but this approach
yields clearer expressions. It, therefore, serves as a starting point for further
analysis.
The average value of 
j




























9and will demand E
j
Dwjk liters of fuel. Multiplying this with the market
share of diesel cars we obtain the total demand for diesel. The demand for

























As noted before, jk = rk(1+tk)wjk. Note that we split fuel price in a
price component set by rms and a tax component set by the government.
Also note that if the price of diesel is increased ceteris paribus two eects
occur. The market share of diesel cars falls and those who remain drive
less. These are the short term eects. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that the fuel producer takes market shares as given. In the long term wjk
cannot be assumed to be constant. For instance, after the oil crisis in the
1970s, more fuel ecient cars were produced, at least in Europe, but this
happened with a lag of a decade.
There is only one rm in the fuel market.2 Let the marginal cost of fuel













where sGjj = F;j(
j
) and sDjj = 1   sGjj. Note that it is not sucient
to calculate the dierence in prices, because unlike car prices consumer
do care about the height of both diesel and gasoline price (cf.4). Since we





= 0 k 6= k (19)
2In view of the Dutch market for fuel, it maybe would be more appropriate to think of a
Stackelberg leader in prices. Shell, the largest seller of fuel to petrol stations in the Netherlands,
advices these petrol stations on sales price. Although owners are free to set prices, in practice
this is the sales price. The petrol station, which are not supplied by Shell, can take this price






=  wjk(1 + tk)E
j
k: (20)

































Substituting (20) for @E
j
k=@rk and solving for rk this leads to:



























These have the same structure as (11). The second term on the RHS is
a markup. A rise in markup can have three reasons: more ecient cars,
less excise and/or VAT and less price sensitive consumers. If cars are more
ecient or there is less excise, then the price of driving one kilometer
decreases and this enables fuel producers to capture at least part of this
eect. It is well known that price sensitivity and markups are inversely
related.
If there is just one car model we get the trivial solution: rk = dk +
(1=(1 + tk)wjk)
4 Simulation
In order to show the eects of introducing a price sensitivity parameter
in the Verboven (2002) model, I have done some simulation on the model
described in equations 10 and 11. In this simulation fuel producer behavior
is exogenous and we treat fuel prices as given. Parameter values are taken
from Verboven (2002, Table 5). Demand and pricing were estimated jointly
11and car producers behave monopolistically. The hypothetical average car
model is sold in Belgium and is not produced in France, Germany or Italy.
It has average horsepower, displacement and weight. These numbers are
taken from Verboven (2002, Table 1 and 2).
Mean intrinsic utility is a linear combination of a constant, horsepower,
displacement and weight. The same applies to marginal cost. The param-
eter values are shown in Table 1. The value of  implies that given an
average lifetime of the car of 10 years consumers have an implicit interest
rate of 6.8% and if the average lifetime of the car is 15 years an implicit
interest rate of 12.2%. Note that the marginal cost dierence is negative
but small compared to an average price dierence of 2000 euros.




G. If , the price
sensitivity parameter, equals zero, then j = 
j



















This means that the expected value of j is dened as:









The probability that j = 
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G + (1   sGjj)E
j
D: (28)










sGjje jG + (1   sGjj)e jD : (29)








Table 2: Description of the 4 scenarios
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 0 0 0
2 0.1 0.06 1.42
3 0.2 0.12 2.84
4 0.5 0.31 7.10
Note: In column (1) are the scenario numbers, in column (2) the absolute price elasticity
of gasoline, in column (3) the implied absolute price elasticity of diesel and in column
(4) the implied value of 
If the expected value of j is known, then the expected value of 
j
0 can be






I consider four scenarios based on four dierent price elasticities of
gasoline. These correspond to values of  and the price elasticity of diesel.
See Table 2 for the values. Scenario 1 is the model as estimated in Ver-
boven (2002). Scenario's 2 and 3 are based on price elasticities as found in
the literature (see Goodwin (1992) for an overview). Scenario 4 is based
on a price-elasticity, which is larger than found in empirical studies. The
scenarios stay the same throughout this section.
Equilibrium is calculated and shown in Table 3. The outcomes are rea-
sonably close to observed dierences in the Belgian car market. Price dif-
ference and market share of gasoline cars are both a bit too high. The
eect of introducing non-zero price sensitivities are minimal. The percent-
age change in both market share and price relative to scenario 1 is less
than one percent for all scenario's.
13Table 3: Outcomes, when 
j
0 has a uniform distribution
Scenario Market share Price Demand for diesel Demand for gasoline
1 0.6037 2962 22043 22043
2 0.6033 2977 22546 21688
3 0.6029 2991 23052 21331
4 0.6020 3026 24590 20254
Note: Market share is the market share of gasoline cars, price is the price dierence
between diesel and gasoline cars in US dollars and the demand for diesel and gasoline
is the demand at the threshold in kilometers.
Table 4: Outcomes, when 
j
0 has a double exponential distribution
Scenario Market share Price Demand for diesel Demand for gasoline
1 0.6153 2461 19617 19617
2 0.5922 2316 19288 18554
3 0.5679 2185 19003 17584
4 0.4914 1857 18371 15131
Note: Market share is the market share of gasoline cars, price is the price dierence
between diesel and gasoline cars in US dollars and the demand for diesel and gasoline
is the demand at the threshold in kilometers.
Verboven (2002) uses the double exponential distribution:






where  is the mean,  the standard deviation and 
 = 0:57721566.3 Take
 = E
j
0 and  = 12000 and calculate the equilibrium for each of the
scenario's. See Table 4.
As we see, the dierences between scenario 1 and scenario 2 and 3
are much larger when using the double exponential distribution, probably
due to a much steeper distribution. The relative changes are captured in
Table 5. For the likely scenario's 2 and 3 these changes are between 4 to
11 percent and for scenario 4 they are above 20%. This indicates, that
ignoring price sensitivity might have quite some implications.
There are two taxes in the model; fuel tax and annual car tax. So far,
the problem has been analyzed in terms of dierences between cars with




i=1 1=i   ln(n)).
14Table 5: Percentage change relative to scenario 1









2 -1.385 (15%) -0.743 (20%)
3 -1.550 (29%) -0.810 (31%)
4 -2.035 (69%) -1.099 (78%)
Note: Behind the price elasticities in parentheses are the percentage dierence with
scenario 1.
gasoline engines and cars with diesel engines. This will also be the way in
which changes in taxes will be analyzed. For both fuel tax and annual car
tax, the tax on gasoline will be increased by a half percent and the tax on
diesel will be decreased by a half percent. The dierence will, more or less,
increase by one percent. Therefore the percentage change in market share




































Note, that when calculating F
j I change the cost of driving one mile (jk)
by a half percent instead of changing tax by a half percent. As long as
fuel producer behavior is not modelled there is no dierence. The results
are shown in Table 6. The dierence between scenario 1 and the other
scenario's are even larger in the elasticities than they were in market share
and price.
Dene government revenue of annual car tax as R = sGjjjG + (1  
sjG)jD and dene the elasticity of government revenue with respect to
























The results are shown in Table 7. As can be seen almost all the eects cancel
out. It is no surprise that this elasticity is almost equal to one since it is
assumed, implicitly, that everybody buys a car, despite the cost attached
to this.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper the model in Verboven (2002) has been extended to include
non-zero price elasticities and the fuel market has been modelled explicitly.
The eects of the rst extension have been examined with simulation. They
have shown, that an error of 5-10% can easily occur if zero price elasticity
is assumed.
The next task is to estimate the model presented in this paper using
data for the Dutch and (probably) the German market. Because each mar-
ket, however it is dened, just gives us 100-150 observations (i.e. j, the
number of models on sale during a particular period) empirical research
requires the combining of several regional or national markets.
Another possibility is to rearrange the model presented in this paper
to t existing panel data. Instead of looking at the aggregate of all choices,
one could look at each individual choice. This expands the number of ob-
servations to the number of members of the panel. Since most studies focus
on mobility, i.e. how, why and how much people drive, detailed information
on the mode of transport, as is needed in the kind of models discussed in
16this paper, is unavailable and therefore it is almost impossible to include
producer behavior.
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18Assume that a product has a price of 1 euro and lasts for T years,
therefore a product originally purchased at t = 0, where t 2 [0;1;2;:::]
denotes time, has to be replaced at t = T;2T;3T;::: Let r > 0 denote
the implicit interest rate, then the present value (denoted by PV) of the
payment equals:






2T + ::: (41)
Since 1=(1 + r)
T < 1, it follows that
PV =
1
1   (1 + r)
 T (42)
Let  be a payment made at t = 0;1;:::, such that the present value of







2 + ::: =
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1   (1 + r)
 T : (45)
A person, who has an implicit interest rate of r and knows that a product
is going to last T years is indierent between paying one euro every T
years or paying  euro every year. Since T  1, it follows that   1. Since
PV > 0 and r=(1 + r) > 0, it follows that  > 0 as well.
C Derivation of the solution of the model
with a uniform distribution





m. Let  = 1
[e jG  
e jD]. Substitute above in (11) to obtain:





Substituting above in (10) gives:
j
msGjj =
aj   (1 + b)cj + (1   sGjj)j
m      j

: (47)
21This is equivalent to:
j
msGjj =
aj   (1 + b)cj      j

+ (1   sGjj)j
m: (48)
Adding j
msGjj to both sides and dividing both sides by 2j
m leads to (12).
Substitute (12) in (11) to obtain:




















After some rearranging (13) is obtained.
22